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INTRODUCTION
The comment: `we live on an island made of coal
surrounded by a sea full of fish, only an organisational
genius could arrange a shortage of both at the same
time', is attributed to Aneurin Bevan. The Royal
Commission on Environmental Pollution,1 the European
Union,2 Downing Street3 and even this journal's
editor4 have highlighted the need for radical reform
to stop over-fishing taking place in our seas. In
response, the UK Government has set aside time for
legislation in the form of a Marine Bill. Reform of the
structure of UK fisheries administration will play a key
part of that Bill.5 It is therefore timely to consider the
role which the public right to fish plays in the current
legal structure of fisheries, as it is an important one
and often overlooked by the commentators. By
looking at its context, history and extent, this article
will investigate whether there are mechanisms within
common law to counter over-fishing or whether the
public right itself needs to be reformed.
DESCRIPTION OF THE PUBLIC RIGHT TO FISH
The public right to fish6 was described by Moore and
Moore7 as follows:
In tidal waters, estuaries and arms of the sea below the
high water mark of ordinary tides situate within the limit of
the kingdom . . . the public as subjects of the realm, have
the right to fish to the exclusion of the subjects of all
foreign powers, except in such parts of those tidal waters
as have been legally appropriated as private fisheries.
Since the Moores' time, UK territorial waters have
expanded from 3 to 12 miles8 from the coast and the
UK has created an exclusive fishing zone extending to
200 miles.9 In neither case did the legislation set out
clearly on what basis British and European fishermen
would be operating in these additional waters but in
the absence of any specific grant on the subject, it is
likely that the public right extended to the 12 and 200
mile limits.10 It is also likely, after the Factortame 11
case, that the public right has extended to EU citizens.
In practice the public right to fish in law means that the
entirety of territorial waters and the exclusive fishing
zone have a primary use as a fishery using the most
intensive methods possible, unless those rights have
been specifically excluded. This is in contrast to the
European Commission's targets for the Common Fish-
eries policy of responsible and sustainable fisheries
practice.12 There is no mechanism in the public right to
fish for seeding the sea or allowing it to lie fallow in
the no take reserves proposed by the Royal Commis-
sion on Environmental Pollution.13
CONTEXT
Property lawyers would recognise three14 rights
granted by the Crown or UK Government departments
to commercial fishermen. These are the public right to
fish, some of whose users have a fishing vessel licence
(of which there are a restricted number),15 some of
whose users qualify for quota (for specific endangered
stock).16 The structure of rights in fishing can be
shown diagrammatically as follows:
Quota and vessel licences have been used as tools to
restrict fishing effort, either by restricting the number
of vessels in the UK fleet or by restricting the catch of
species in danger of decline. They also contain
contractual restrictions and obligations. Fishing vessel
10 The Australian Supreme Court confirmed this to be the case in
Commonwealth of Australia v Yarmirr (2001) 208 CLR 1.
11 R v Secretary of State for Transport ex parte Factortame
(Factortame II) [1991] ECR 1±4586.
12 Green Paper ± The Future of the Common Fisheries Policy (n 2) 254
at 11.7.
13 Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution Ch 8 p 206.
14 Excluding for simplicity shellfish orders and salmon licensing.
15 Sea Fish Conservation Act 1967 s 4.
16 Normally quota are imposed as part of the common fisheries
policy under s 30 of the Fisheries Act 1981.
1 Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution Turning the Tide
Addressing the Impact of Fisheries on the Marine Environment (HMSO
2004).
2 Green Paper ± The Future of the Common Fisheries Policy
(European Commission 2001).
3 Prime Minister's Strategy Unit Net Benefits: A sustainable and
profitable future for UK fishing (Cabinet Office 2004).
4 W Howarth Water Law 12 [2003] 1±4.
5 A Marine Bill: A Consultation Document (Defra 2006) 4.
6 Sometimes known as the common law right to fish.
7 S Moore and H Moore The History and Law of Fisheries (Stevens
and Haynes 1903) 95.
8 Territorial Sea Act 1987.
9 Fishery Limits Act 1976.
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licences only operate in respect of the vessel. It is the
public right which permits a fisherman to catch fish.17
In England and Wales this public right has been
managed traditionally18 by the creation of byelaws
from Sea Fisheries Committees19 and Ministerial
Orders from Defra20 (often implementing EU policy).21
These consist mainly of limitations on the public right,
which are often highly technical and site specific.22
The result is that some fisheries, such as commercial
fishing from boats, are embroiled in a complex web of
bureaucracy, while others, such as recreational sea
angling or commercial capture of fish without a boat,
are barely regulated at all.23
HISTORICAL JUSTIFICATION
The first recorded reference to a public right to fish
was in the sixth century in the Byzantine legal
codification, the Digest of Justinian. An owner of an
estate tried to retain tuna fishing rights when he sold
the estate. It was decided that, although the contract
itself was binding upon the purchaser, a contract could
not be imposed upon the sea `because by nature it is
open to all'.24 This Roman law did not arrive in England
until the twelfth century when it was transposed by the
English jurist Henry Bracton.25 Prior to that many tidal
fisheries had been given away or sold by the Crown.26
The public right is still excluded from these ancient
private fisheries to this day.27 If the Norman kings of
England were able to exclude the public right to fish in
tidal waters, it suggests that such exclusion was
workable and not against nature as the Digest of
Justinian would have us believe.
Many authorities (including Halsbury's Laws)28 cite the
Magna Carta as the reason the Crown made no further
private fisheries. There is no such reference in the
statute itself,29 however, this mistake has now become
settled law by virtue of the case of Malcolmson v
O'Dea.30 Because of its constitutional importance, the
erroneous involvement of the Magna Carta lends
weight to sentimental arguments that somehow the
public right to fish is a basic human right to all men; it
is submitted that is not a tenable argument.
In Scotland the public right to fish was created by
statute.31 The preamble of the Act cites two reasons for
its creation, because the fishery: `considerably adds to
the national wealth, but is moreover, a fruitful nursery
of able seamen for the public service'. The economic
argument can only be sustained, if common public
ownership remains the optimum mechanism for
ownership of marine fishing rights. The decline in
Britain's naval importance makes the second argument
less relevant.
None of the historic justifications behind the creation
and maintenance of the public right to fish seem
particularly germane today.
INTERESTING CASE LAW
There have not been a great number of cases on the
nature and extent of the public right to fish. Those that
there are therefore take on special significance. Many
de-mark the technical extent of the right, but a few
provide something more.
Adair v National Trust
The Northern Irish case of Adair v National Trust 32
confirmed shellfish collection on the foreshore was part
of the public right and bait digging for personal use was
ancillary to the public right. The case also contained
some useful obiter on the judge's perception of the
extent of the public right, as arguments of nature
conservation had been raised in the case:
The public right to fish in sea waters and on the foreshore
was a common law development of some antiquity and
emerged in an age that failed to recognise the environ-
mental and ecological impact that flows from an untram-
melled right to reap the harvests of nature. The public
right to fish paid no regard to the threat of depletion of
fish stocks or to the impact such a depletion would have
on the natural chain.33
Girvan J then goes on to state that it is for Parliament
via the Fisheries Acts to limit the public right. It seems
a rather fatalistic approach from the judiciary to accept
that environmental destruction (and therefore the
consequential reduction in the utility of the public
right) is inevitable. In the absence of workable
regulation from Parliament, it is for the court to
determine whether modern industrial fishing techni-
ques can be authorised by a right which was granted in
ancient times to people using sail, oar and wooden
boats. It is submitted that it is a case of fact and degree
depending on the circumstances.
The concept of an `untrammelled' public right con-
trasts with the approach of the court in other areas. It
can be compared with the concept of `excessive user'34
in McAdams Homes Limited v Robinson. Here an
intensification in the nature of the user of a dominant
tenement can revoke its rights over a servient tene-
ment. On the public highway the courts have estab-
lished a `reasonable user'35 test. Indeed Moore and
17 On Defra's view see D Symes and S Boyes Review of Management
Regimes and Relevant Legislation in UK Waters (University of Hull
2005) 58.
18 Devolution has created some jurisdictional questions for Defra/
Welsh Assembly Government for marine matters.
19 Sea Fisheries Regulation Act 1966 s 5.
20 Various statutory authorities.
21 Sea Fisheries Act 1981 s 30.
22 Symes and Boyes (n 17) 51.
23 Hence the Chinese cocklepickers tragedy at Morecambe Bay.
24 The Digest of Justinian Book VIII Title IV 13 translated by S Scott
The Civil Law (The Central Trust Company ± Liberty Library of
Constitutional Classics 1932).
25 Bracton De Legibus Consuetudinibus Agliae (The Laws and Customs
of England) 1230s. See http://www.hlsl.law.harvard.edu/bracton, vol II p 40.
26 S Moore and H Moore (n 7) xlii.
27 See earlier description of the public right.
28 Halsbury's Laws vol 18 para 615.
29 S Moore and H Moore (n 7) xxxix.
30 (1862) 10 HL Cas 593.
31 Act 29 Geo II c23.
32 Adair v National Trust for Places of Historic Interest or Natural
Beauty and Another [1998] NI 33.
33 ibid 44 per Girvan J.
34 [2004] EWCA Civ 214.
35 DPP v Jones [1992] 2 AC 240 at 256B±C per Lord Irvine of Lairg LC.
202 (2005) 16 WATER LAW : APPLEBY: THE PUBLIC RIGHT TO FISH: IS IT FIT FOR PURPOSE?
Moore's History and Law of Fisheries,36 Halsbury's
Laws 37 and many others state that the public right
should be exercised reasonably but there is no specific
authority for this assertion. Over-fishing is a conse-
quential response to the untrammelled use of the
resource, each new piece of fishing equipment,
implicitly authorised by an untrammelled right inten-
sifies the effort on a dwindling stock. The question for
the government, the fishing industry and the courts to
consider is whether it is reasonable for such intensi-
fication to be authorised prima facie without any
thought for the future sustainability of the stock.
Yarmirr v Queensland
Shortly after Australia extended its territorial bound-
aries from 3 to 12 miles native people from the Croker
Islands region of the Northern Territories (which lay
between the 3 and 12 mile limits) laid claim to various
rights under domestic Australian legislation which
protected native title. Part of the claim was that the
native people had fished exclusively in an area off the
Croker Islands and they sought confirmation through
the courts that the public right to fish would not apply
to the area, which they viewed as exclusively belonging
to them. The case reached the High Court of Australia
under the name of Commonwealth of Australia v
Yarmirr38 and Kirby J made some useful findings:
. . . the public right to fish is based on the (now
unscientific) notion that uncontrolled catching of fish in
sea areas cannot diminish the stock. The claimants do not
concede the right of others to fish in the determination
area except in accordance with licences granted under
valid legislation . . . In an area of pre-existing native title,
the common law right to fish may operate subject to, and
be defeated by, the underlying native title rights and
interests in the claimant's sea country.
Kirby J decided that the claimants must sufficiently
discharge proof that it was their custom exclusively to
fish an area and that this custom had not been
interrupted since the inception of the common law
(which in the case of Australia was 1828 rather than the
date of the Magna Carta).39 Kirby J then went on to
confirm that in making this decision he had not
changed the common law, as it already recognised
those private fisheries created before the Magna
Carta.40 The case does not set a clear precedent for
local communities in the UK, which have customarily
excluded newcomers, claiming a private fishery. How-
ever, many UK fisheries particularly inshore are only
fished commercially by members of a local fishing
community and sometimes according to voluntary
agreements among that community.41 The case ac-
knowledges that exclusive fisheries can operate
acceptably inside the common law system, but sets a
hurdle in the UK context that such communities must
have native title rights, which are peculiar to Australia's
relationship with its aboriginal population.42 No such
relationship exists in the UK; however, the basis of this
argument is on the restrictions of the Magna Carta
(and the subsequent case of Malcolmson v O'Dea).43
Given the lack of evidence for such restriction on the
Crown in the Magna Carta, it may be appropriate to
revisit Malcolmson v O'Dea to create circumstances
where UK communities can prove exclusive local
fisheries.
Canada v Quebec
The case of Attorney-General for Canada v Attorney-
General for Quebec 44 is a complex constitutional case
concerning whether provincial governments had the
power to grant exclusive rights to fish in the sea and
thereby exclude the public right. Part of the decision
dealt with the placing of fixed fishing traps. Viscount
Haldane commented:
It is true that the public right of fishing in tidal waters does
not extend to a right to fix to the solum (soil) kiddles
(salmon traps), weirs, or other engines of this kind. This is
because the solum is not vested in the public but may be
so in either the Crown or private owners.45
The implication is that attaching a fixed engine to the
seabed is incompatible with the seabed owner's rights
because such attachment is a right associated with
ownership. Many fishing techniques involve serious
interference with the solum.46 Where such techniques
are being operated it is open for debate as to whether
such activities go beyond the rights over the seabed
owner's freehold.
Whelan v Hewson
In the Irish case of Whelan v Hewson 47 salmon fishing
(possible under the public right to fish in Ireland at the
time) had been excluded by statute in the mouth of a
river, while those upstream fished under licence.
Hewson fished in a proscribed area at a time when
Whelan was fishing under licence further upstream. As
a result Whelan claimed that Hewson had captured
fish which he would otherwise have caught and he had
therefore suffered a loss.
The result shows that it is possible to develop fisheries
protective measures using torts rather than criminal
liability and state enforcement. Hewson's defence
raised the argument that as Whelan was one of a
number of licensed persons fishing, the injuries
complained of were not actionable. All the licensed
fishermen may have suffered as a whole, so Whelan
would have difficulty proving his individual loss.
However, Chief Baron Pigot found:
Nothing beyond public notoriety is needed to show, that if
at certain seasons, salmon are caught while pursuing their
36 S Moore and H Moore (n 7) 96.
37 Halsbury's Laws vol 18 para 613.
38 Commonwealth of Australia v Yarmirr (n 10) 282.
39 ibid 289.
40 ibid 290.
41 Such as the Lyme Bay voluntary agreement fostered by Devon Sea
Fisheries Committee.
42 Commonwealth of Australia v Yarmirr (n 10) 299.
43 Malcolmson v O'Dea (n 30) 593.
44 (1921) 56 DLR 358.
45 ibid 367 per Viscount Haldane.
46 V Bradshaw, L Veale, A Hill and A Brand The Effect of Scallop
Dredging on Irish Sea Benthos: Experiments Using a Closed Area
(Hydrobiologia 465 Kluwer Academic) 129±38.
47 [1872] IR VI 283.
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upward course against the stream, damage must ensue to
those who have a right to fish, and endeavour to exercise
that right, in the upper waters.48
The legal argument was fleshed out in the finding of
Baron Fitzgerald. He found that, although licensed, in
this case it was the public right which was infringed,
rather than a new private right to fish created by a
licence. The licensing process merely reduced the
number of people who could exercise the right, rather
than taking it away entirely. Thus, for liability to exist in
tort it was not sufficient for there to be a breach in the
statutory provisions, as it was the public, rather than
the licensee, who owned the right:
Of such public rights the Crown is guardian, and
proceedings to redress any disturbance of the right belong
exclusively to the Crown, unless the party disturbed can
show special damage to itself.49
The court found for the plaintiff, Whelan, and
established that it was possible to claim in tort for
injuries arising from unauthorised fishing, because he
had sustained those special damages.
Because there is a public perception demonstrated in
Adair that the public right to fish is `untrammelled' in
principle, it is easy to overlook the existing common
law restrictions. It is unlikely that the man on the
Clapham omnibus would wish for the public right to
extend beyond reasonable activity. Yarmirr gives a
glimpse of a future where customary rights of inshore
fishermen can be protected from newcomers. Canada
v Quebec shows that interference with the seabed may
well be beyond the public right. Whelan v Hewson
shows that it is possible to claim damages against
those acting outside the public right, by breaching
current statutory arrangements. These are the kernels
of a common law protective legal network which has
not yet fully developed.
CIVIL LITIGATION FOR FISHERIES PROTECTION
There is scope for further development of litigation
but a systematic series of claims has not come about.
Negligence
Fishermen owe a duty of care to other fishermen as
exercisers of a public right in much the same way that
roads users owe each other a duty of care. The main
question is whether over-fishing is a breach of that
duty. The standard for a breach of duty is that of an
ordinary person50 and that they are merely carrying
out common practice is not a defence.51 Thus, a
fisherman whose livelihood has been affected by the
damaging operations of a destructive fishing practice
could possibly have the basis for a claim, if it could be
shown that practice in that particular area would not
be considered reasonable by an ordinary man.
Proving negligence is on the balance of probabilities
and would very much depend on the individual
circumstances. It would need to be reasonably fore-
seeable that damage would be caused52 which would
result in loss or injury to the claimant. However, a
single fishing act by one boat, which so destroyed a
fishery that it did not recover, would be the kind of
circumstances which would be likely to lead to liability.
The more complex the fishery, the less likely such a
claim would be to succeed.
As fish stock cannot be replaced the courts would be
likely to award compensation on the basis of what was
fair for the circumstances. Courts do not normally
grant injunctions for negligence.
Negligence has certain drawbacks as a method of
environmental protection, as it can only be applied by
those who suffer a direct loss.
Public nuisance
This is a complex area of law which is not really a tort
at all but a crime:
Every person is guilty of an offence at the common law
known as public nuisance who does an act not warranted
by law, or omits to discharge a legal duty if the effect is to
endanger life, health, property, morals or comfort of the
public or to obstruct the public in the exercise of rights
common to all Her Majesty's subjects.53
The first question on this basis for the courts to decide
is whether a fishing activity complained of goes
beyond the public right to fish. This is one of fact
and degree. If an activity is illegal an action would be
possible (as happened in the case of Whelan v
Hewson). If more limited interpretations are placed
on the right to fish (such as limitation to reasonable
activities for instance) actions in public nuisance may
also be available.
The second question is whether the activity com-
plained of falls into the list of potential nuisances.
Whelan v Hewson is helpful here too as it sets the
precedent for allowing public nuisance for obstruction
by removal of the fish, to be an obstruction of the
public right to fish itself.
The action is prima facie available to the general
public. As members of the public cannot sue, it would
need to be a `relator action' by the Attorney-General
taking the case on their behalf. In doing so the
Attorney-General must be sure that a substantial
enough number of people are affected54 and that
there is a strong enough case to lend his name to.
From an environmental protection point of view, this
action is very useful because it allows people who are
not financially interested in the proceedings to take
the case. Interest groups wishing to protect stock from
destructive fishing methods could conceivably take
action.
The action of public nuisance is also available to
private individuals, if they can claim special damages
and it thereby becomes a tort. This would be a similar
48 ibid 287 per Pigot CB.
49 ibid 290 per Fitzgerald B.
50 Hazell v British Transport Commission [1958] 1 WLR 169.
51 Lloyds Bank v Savory [1933] AC 201.
52 The Wagon Mound (No 1) [1961] AC 388.
53 Archbold's Criminal Pleading and Practice (1985) paras 27±44.
54 Attorney-General v PYA Quarries [1957] 2 QB 169.
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situation to a negligence action and be particularly
available to those who could show loss or damage in
the recreational as well as commercial sector. An
injunction against the activity as well as damages
would be available as potential remedies.
Traditionally, the fishing industry has not settled its
differences in the courts.55 There are other arenas for
conflict resolution within fisheries organisations, the
government or a mixture of the two,56 but these tend
not to award the type of damages which would act as
an effective deterrent for destructive activities.
SUMMARY
The public right to fish is the legal basis for over-
fishing. By having very few perceived parameters it
establishes the principle that a fisherman can carry out
any fishing activity regardless of the long-term health
of the stock, unless it is specifically excluded.
The public right to fish is based in law upon erroneous
reference to the Magna Carta. Its historic justifications
are not appropriate today and even those judges who
have gone on to uphold the great breadth of the
public right have done so acknowledging that: `the
public right to fish is based on the (now unscientific)
notion that uncontrolled catching of fish in sea areas
cannot diminish the stock'.57
There has been little case law on the subject; however,
case law could be developed limiting the public right
to reasonable activity, reducing its effect on the seabed
and allowing the development of exclusive rights for
local communities.
Mechanisms exist in tort law to take action to protect
the long-term viability of the stock. These torts have not
been developed, as much of the management effort
has been carried out by the government, fishermen's
organisations or a mixture of the two. As a result the
deterrent of damages has not been applied.
CONCLUSION
The public right to fish in tidal waters as it is currently
understood is the legal embodiment of a culture and
philosophy of over-fishing. Over time it is inevitable
that the scope of the right is re-interpreted as the
courts have the courage of their convictions and limit
it to those activities which are reasonable and sustain-
able and reflect the cultural mores of today. That
development may not be soon enough to save the
stock. In the Marine Bill we should be investing in more
considered limitations and definitions of the public's
right to fish. This will encourage a civil legal framework
to protect a reasonable and sustainable fishery as the
command and control model58 of centralised fisheries
management does not seem to be working.
55 For example see Fishing News 10 February 2006 letter by P Stewart
of the Clyde Fisheries Association.
56 See J Eagle Democracy and Natural Resources: British and
American Approaches to Public Participation in Fishery Management,
British Council 2004.
57 Commonwealth of Australia v Yarmirr (n 10) 282. 58 Symes and Boyes (n 17) 51.
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